Intended for teachers of diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest. Suggestions for future updates are welcome.
Bruce Gregory can be reached at BGregory@gwu.edu and BGregory1@aol.com
Bruce Gregory, American Diplomacy’s Public Dimension: Practitioners as Change Agents in Foreign Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).
Sherwood Demitz, “Memories From a Cold War Summit,” American Diplomacy, August 2024. In this vivid personal recollection, retired US Foreign Service officer Sherwood “Woody” Demitz discusses his memories of the historic 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev presidential summit in Moscow. It led to détente and signings of the SALT I Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the US-USSR Incidents at Sea Treaty. Surrounding the substance were pressures on diplomats of a possible last-minute cancellation (the US had dropped aerial mines in North Vietnam’s Haiphong harbor trapping Soviet cargo ships), massive international media coverage, and a dinner for Brezhnev and the Politburo at Spaso House, the residence of the US ambassador. Demitz’s public diplomacy career combined foreign service postings, audience and media research, and international broadcasting.
Mervyn Frost, “The Global Diplomatic Practice: Constituting an Ethical World Order,” in J.E. Spence, Claire Yorke, and Alister Masser, eds., A New Theory and Practice of Diplomacy: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, (I.B. Taurus, 2021), 15-36 [see book review below]. Frost (Kings College London) makes interesting and debatable claims pertinent to discourse on practice theory, ethics and diplomacy, and public diplomacy. First, in contrast to many scholars who treat practice theory as what practitioners do instrumentally and situationally, Frost analyzes diplomatic practices as constitutive components of “the global society of sovereign states” and “global civil society.” Second, it follows, he argues, that in a world of diverse ethical codes, ethical standards for diplomats cannot be drawn from beyond diplomacy. Rather, they “can only be understood from within the social practices in which they are constituted as actors.” He divides everyday global diplomatic practices into “administration” (e.g., issuing passports, facilitating trade, and managing exchanges) and “politics” resolving disputes between states “about the rules of association within the global practice of states” (e.g., about claims to territory, reparations after wars, and constitutional issues in international organizations). Third, Frost contends these practices have become more complex due to media and communication forms open to publics and the “extensive strategic communications” of government leaders, which he states is sometimes “misleadingly referred to as ‘public diplomacy.’” A more accurate term, he argues, is simply “international politics” or the struggle for power and material advantage.
Frost’s chapter is useful because it prompts reflection on salient issues in practice theory and ethics in diplomacy. However, it is problematic in its assumption of a hard binary between the society of sovereign states and a “macro practice” of anarchy in the absence of central government — a category distinction that overlooks a vast domain of governance rules, norms, and institutions in the space between anarchy and government. His offhand dismissal of public diplomacy fails to consider that in essence it is a political instrument central to diplomatic practice and relationships between government and governance actors and their publics. For an insightful review of the book and Frost’s chapter, see Kristin Anabel Eggling, “Review Feature: New Perspectives on Diplomacy,” E-International Relations, July 9, 2022.
Yuval Noah Harari, Nexus: A Brief History of Information Networks from the Stone Age to AI, (Random House, 2024). In this sweeping new book, Harari (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, author of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind) challenges what he calls the “naive view” of information. By this he means the idea that information’s primary role in history is to represent a preexisting reality, that sufficient information can lead to truth, which in turn can lead to power and wisdom, and that good information will drive out bad information in the marketplace of ideas. For Harari, most information does not represent reality, although sometimes it does. Rather, because information always connects different points in a network, our starting point should be how information connects people and new networks over time. Part one of the book discusses ways humans invented information technologies that improved connectivity — shared stories, clay tablets, print, mass media. Chapters explore how information networks have been used to create myths and bureaucracies, authoritarian and democratic power structures, resurgent populism, fantasies of infallibility, and self-correcting mechanisms.
With part one as an essential historical perspective, part two interrogates AI — a fundamentally different technology that does not rely on human mythmakers and human bureaucracies to function. What happens when computers with autonomous agency run bureaucracies and invent new myths? How should we distinguish between consciousness and independent decision-making capabilities? What are the implications of computer-to-computer information chains without humans, relentless networks that are always “on,” and computer-generated narratives that a computer’s algorithms alone curate and interpret? What do these inorganic information capabilities mean for democracy, economic models, cultural norms, and instruments of governance and political power? Harari is not a technology determinist; we have choices. In part three he explores the implications of unfathomable AI algorithms for democracy, populism, and authoritarianism, possible “digital empires,” and the heavy responsibility of making good choices and building strong self-correcting capabilities. Harari earned his global reputation by making powerful arguments through impressive storytelling, humor, and conceptual clarity. Some reviewers, including technology experts and scholars bent on writing for other specialists, are critical of Harari’s account. But there is broad reader and reviewer enthusiasm for his creative bridging of scholarship and public discussion of one of the most important issues of our time. His book is a compelling read for teachers and students of diplomacy’s public dimension.
Stuart MacDonald and Andrew Murray, Soft Power at a Turning Point: A Comparative Analysis, 2024, British Council. In this 50-page report, commissioned from ICR Research Ltd, London, the authors compare the “cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy” activities of the British Council and counterpart organizations. Key findings include the following. (1) Countries are focusing soft power assets more on national interests and their foreign and economic policies than shared global challenges. (2) More programs are designed for domestic audiences. (3) Soft power is increasingly mobilized to promote national identities “sometimes assertively or controversially.” (4) More control is “exerted by governments over arm’s length bodies like the British Council.” The report, filled with instructive graphics, compares resources, “digital maturity,” and global reach. The authors recognize a variety of challenges in their comparative analysis: dissimilar connections between governments and civil society, differences in definitions of soft power, complexities in operationalizing digital and analog tools and methods, and structural contrasts between foreign affairs ministries and organizations comparable to the British Council. Despite these analytical concerns, the report is an instructive global overview and online resource for teachers and practitioners.
Jessica T. Mathews, “What Was the Biden Doctrine?” Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2024. The Carnegie Endowment’s Distinguished Fellow Jessica Mathews argues four years is insufficient time to establish a foreign policy doctrine. Nevertheless, Biden’s commitment to diplomacy backed by strength is an approach well-suited to today’s world if it is not overturned by a successor. Her article is a report card on Biden’s achievements and strategic mistakes. High grades: winning the trust of allies, institutionalizing a deep American presence in Asia, restoration of a US presence in multilateral organizations and agreements, ending the longest “forever war” in Afghanistan, and an innovative response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Low grades: undermining an ambiguous “one China” policy and escalating tensions over Taiwan, a stubborn unwillingness to use US leverage with Israel to reduce staggering levels of death and suffering in Gaza, trade protectionism, lack of sustained nuclear arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy, a Manichean division between autocracies and democracies, and an unproductive “Summit for Democracies.” Mathews makes no predictions in the face of historical uncertainties, but overall Biden has used diplomacy to bring about profound changes in foreign policy “not to accommodate American decline but to reflect the country’s inherent strength.”
Ahmed Nabil, “Contact Groups as Diplomatic Intervention Tools in Civil Wars: US Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Online publication July 25, 2024. Nabil (Wayne State University and a former diplomat) examines contact groups as a distinct mode of diplomatic intervention and engagement in conflicts. Contact groups are different from track one and track two negotiations, he argues, and they do not include parties to civil wars. Using qualitative methods, consisting primarily of unstructured and anonymous interviews with mid-career, senior, and former US officials who participated in conflict group meetings, his article examines case studies of contact groups in civil conflicts in Libya’s P3+3, the Syria Small Group, and the Yemen Quartet. His interview questions explored each groups’ formation, meeting dynamics, relations with UN processes, and effectiveness from the US perspective. Nabil concludes the three groups failed to achieve success in achieving a final settlement. Nevertheless, they served US interests. They were a forum for dialogue and advancing US policies. They were a means to build support for UN envoys in these conflicts. And they helped to achieve US interests such as guaranteeing Libyan oil exports and financial support to territories liberated from ISIL in Syria. Nabil also argues this mode of diplomacy can support engagement between stakeholders with different views of conflict and provide a useful supplement to other modes of multilateral diplomacy. His article is a good example of how analysis of practice can illuminate conceptual issues in diplomacy.
Jack Spence, Alastair Masser, and Claire Yorke, eds., New Perspectives on Diplomacy, A New Theory and Practice of Diplomacy, Volume 1, Contemporary Diplomacy in Action, Volume 2, (I.B. Tauris, 2021). Spence (Kings College London), Masser (Legatum Institute), and Yorke (Yale University) argue a seismic shift in world order and complex emerging challenges pose fundamental questions for the nature, practice, and study of diplomacy — fading American hegemony; rising multipolarity; geopolitical, technological, and demographic changes; and diminished distinctions between war and peace, state and non-state actors, formal and informal dialogue, and values and interests. Chapters in two volumes explore what these trends mean for continuity and change in the study and practice of diplomacy. Volume 1 includes chapters on diplomacy and ethics, identity, and empathy; relations between diplomacy and conflict resolution, small state politics, summitry, and intelligence; and the theoretical value of practice theory. Volume 2 includes chapters on diplomacy and social media, the environment, information war, domestic populations, emotions, and social movements. Diplomacy remains indispensable, the editors contend, and its “widening aperture” embraces more actors and more sub-disciplines. Central questions going forward: what skills and experiences will next generation diplomats need; how should we study and teach diplomacy; and how should we bridge the academic / practice divide? (Suggested by Kathy Fitzpatrick, University of South Florida)
Daya Kishan Thussu, Changing Geopolitics of Global Communication, (Routlege, 2024). Thussu (Hong Kong Baptist University and previously University of Westminster in London) examines issues at the intersection of geopolitics — shaped by decline in a US-led West, the rise of China, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and global communication — shaped by transformative digital technologies and the role of artificial intelligence in weaponizing information. Chapters explore the historical origins of the 21st century’s global information infrastructure, “digital democracy vs. digital imperialism,” how military conflict has been framed by Western media to advance geopolitical interests, weaponization of information in the Russia-Ukraine war, cyberwarfare, and emerging characteristics of a new global information order.
Kate Wright, Martin Scott, and Mel Bunce, Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America, (Oxford University Press, 2024). Efforts by government officials to politicize news coverage by the Voice of America (VOA) have been present from its creation. Senior VOA broadcasters were fired for their coverage of Italy’s King Victor Emanuel III in 1943. Senator Joseph McCarthy mounted vile attacks on VOA in the 1950s. The White House and senior USIA officials deleted content in VOA’s coverage of the US evacuation from Vietnam in 1975. The State Department tried to prevent VOA from airing an interview with Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2001. Examples from a very long list. In this timely book, Wright (University of Edinburgh), Scott (University of East Anglia), and Bunce (University of London) take a deep dive into VOA’s politicization by US Agency for Global Media CEO Michael Pack during the last seven months of the Trump administration. Adopting the theoretical framework of “government capture” — understood as ways governments and civil society allies directly and indirectly politicize journalism in public service media — the authors discuss Pack’s actions in detail, their cumulative effect in undermining democratic checks and balances, and VOA’s vulnerabilities to future politicization.
The book brings needed scholarship to examination of historical, conceptual, and practitioner issues in government media. It is distinguished by its evidence-based research, much of it derived from Freedom of Information Act requests. It also serves as a needed reform primer for those seeking to strengthen VOA’s journalism firewall and address continuing risks of politicization. There is one significant weakness in their research. The authors did not seek to interview Pack, his appointees, and others on the questionable grounds that doing so risked disrupting the “delicate processes” of investigations that might result in criminal and civil lawsuits.
Irene Wu, Measuring Soft Power in International Relations, (Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2024). Irene Wu (Georgetown University, US Federal Communications Commission) takes a deep dive into the meaning and measurement of soft power. She argues soft power can be quantified in ways that make possible comparisons across societies and political entities and analyses across time. Her soft power rubric has three people-to-people interactions — emigration, studying abroad, and traveling abroad — and a fourth mediated interaction, watching foreign movies. These indicators are arranged on a spectrum spanning short- and long-term attraction. Part one of the book explores recent conceptual developments in soft power research and how ideas from related fields of study can provide tools to study soft power. Part two applies her conceptual framework to case studies: US movies and popular culture, international education hubs, India’s emigrants, Russia’s and China’s soft power compared, soft power in Southeast Asia, and the strengths and limitations of global soft power rankings.
Recent Items of Interest
Madison Alder, “State Department Conducting Market Research on an LLM it Could Customize,” August 5, 2024, FedScoop.
Matt Armstrong, “Two Examples of Disinformation, One of Great Comms, Plus a Still Relevant Observation,” September 17, 2024; “Functional Discrepancy: Syncing Geographies of Bureaucracies,” September 13, 2024; “Tactical Solutions Will Not Fix a Strategic Defect,” September 9, 2024, Arming for the War We’re In substack.
Kadir Jun Ayhan, “Diplomacy Analytics LLC.” Research Consultancy Firm.
Evan Cooper and Lucas Ruiz, “Domestic Engagement is Needed in State Department Modernization,” September 9, 2024, Stimson.
Michael Crowley, “Senior U.S. Diplomat Will Lead Kamala Harris’s Running Mate’s Team,” August 2, 2024, The New York Times.
Gordon Duguid, “USIA: Let It Be,” July 30, 2024, Public Diplomacy Council of America.
Renee Earl, “Getting NATO Membership to 32: Why We Needed Public Diplomacy,” August 2024, American Diplomacy.
Francesca Ebel and Mary Ilyushina, “Artists Say Putin’s Push for Patriotism is Killing Russian Culture,” July 29, 2024, The Washington Post.
Kristin Eggeling, “Field Notes from the Bay: Why are There Diplomatic Offices in Silicon Valley?” August 30, 2024, CPD Blog, USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
Michael Gfoeller and David H. Rundell, “It’s Time to Fix the Foreign Service to Give Diplomacy a Chance,” August 6, 2024, Newsweek.
Alexey Gorbachev, “Russian Hacker Attacks Target Former US Ambassadors, Reveal Prior Penetration,” August 28, 2024, Voice of America.
Garrett M. Graff, “Antony Blinken Dragged US Diplomacy Into the 21st Century. Even He is Surprised by the Results,” September 4, 2024, Wired.
Bruce Gregory, “Remembering Tom Korologos (1933-2024),” August 2024, Public Diplomacy Council of America.
“Tom Korologos, Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, 91,” July 31, 2024, The National Herald; Brian Murphy, “Tom Korologos, Guru of Senate Confirmation Crossfire, Dies at 91,” August 1, 2024, The Washington Post; Richard Sandomir, “Tom Korologos, Sherpa of Republican Nominees Dies at 91,” August 7, 2024, The New York Times.
Stuart Holliday, “America’s Mega-decade of Sports Is a Powerhouse of Diplomacy,” August 17, 2024, The Hill.
Susan R. Johnson, “Project 2025: Department of State,” July 29, 2024, Fulcrum.
“Kaine and Young Introduce Bill to Empower State Department and USAID to Counter People’s Republic of China, Other Threats,” July 31, 2024, Senator Tim Kaine Press Release; Gabe Murphy, “Senators Want to Infect Other Agencies with ‘Unfunded’ Wish Lists,” August 6, 2024, Responsible Statecraft.
Kathy Kemper, “Sports Diplomacy Playing on in Paris Sets a Global Example,” August 6, 2024, The Hill.
“Daniel Kimmage: Countering Disinformation Through Resilient Information Ecosystem, Partnerships,” September 18, 2024, This Day.
Dana S. LaFon, “How the U.S. Can Counter Disinformation from Russia and China,” August 14, 2024, Council on Foreign Relations.
Jorge Marinho, Julio Ventura, Lourenco Ribeiro, “Media Diplomacy and the Ongoing Armed Conflict in Ukraine,” August 2, 2024, CPD Blog, USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
Samantha Masunaga, “As Hollywood and Streaming Go Global, U.S. State Department Leans on Power of Film,” September 19, 2024, Los Angeles Times.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Invest in Soft Power,” September 9, 2024, “Letters to the Next President,” Foreign Policy.
Kathryn Palmer, “Defense Department Cuts 13 of Its Language Flagship Programs,” May 15, 2024, Inside Higher Ed.
Mitzi Perdue, “A New England Yankee Tells America’s Story,” September 11, 2024, CEPA.
Rick Ruth and Scott Lingenfelter, “The High Ground of Soft Power,” August 2024, Public Diplomacy Council of America.
Cynthia P. Schneider, “Afghanistan: A Window Onto a Potential Harris-Walz Pivot on Foreign Policy,” and “Breakdancing in Afghanistan: Cultural Resilience Three Years After U.S. Withdrawal,” August 29, 2024; CPD Blog, USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
“A Short-term Work Visa Shows the Benefits of Immigration,” August 8, 2024, The Economist.
Tara Sonenshine, “Gaza’s Fighting Pauses for Vaccines Show Power of Health Diplomacy,” September 4, 2024, The Baltimore Sun.
Dan Spokojny, “Advice for the Inaugural Provost of the Foreign Service Institute,” September 12, 2024; “Ten Principles for Foreign Policy Expertise,” September 5, 2024; “State Department FFRDC: Public Comment for the Federal Register,” August 14, 2024, Foreign Policy Expertise Substack.
Dan Spokojny, “How to Embrace Uncertainty in Foreign Policy,” August 21, 2024, Foreign Policy Expertise Substack.
“Talent is Scarce. Yet Many Countries Spurn It,” August 15, 2024, The Economist.
Paul Tassi, “‘The Diplomat’ Season 2 Gets An Imminent Release Date on Netflix,” August 8, 2024, Forbes.
US House Committee on Small Business Interim Staff Report, “Small Business: Instruments and Casualties of the Censorship-Industrial Complex,” September 2024; Gabe Kaminsky, “Embattled State Department Office [Global Engagement Center] Skirted Mandate in Funding ‘Censorship’ Groups: House GOP,” September 10, 2024, Washington Examiner.
Tim Walz, “Dear Foreign Service: We’ve Got Your Back,” January-February 2018, The Foreign Service Journal.
Michael Walzer, “Israel’s Pager Bombs Have No Place in a Just War,” September 21, 2024, The New York Times; Brian Finucane, “Law of War Questions Raised by Exploding Pagers in Lebanon,” September 18, 2024, Just Security.
Jian (Jay) Wang and Andrew Dubbins, “What Artificial Intelligence Means for Public Diplomacy,” August 12, 2024, CPD Blog, USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
Bill Wanlund, “Feminists to the Fore,” September 2023; “Resetting Public Perceptions in Chile,” August 2024;Remarks by Ambassador Bernadette M. Meehan, recipient of PDCA’s 2024 award for Public Diplomacy Leadership by a Senior Officer, August 2024, Public Diplomacy Council of America.
Gem from the Past
Marcy E. Gallo, “Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), Updated April 3, 2020. The CRS defines FFRDCs as a special class of research and development (R&D) institutions owned by the federal government, but operated by universities, other nonprofits, and industrial firms. They provide federal agencies with R&D that cannot be obtained within government or the private sector alone. The State Department through Federal Register notices is requesting public comment on its first proposed FFRDC for diplomacy. This CRS report provides information on the origins, activity types, characteristics, and federal funding of the 42 FFRDCs sponsored by the 13 federal agencies (currently 15) when the report was written. The report summarizes issues of interest to Congress: agency oversight and management, competition with the private sector, diversification of activities or “mission creep,” competitive FFRDC contracts vs. long-term relationships with sponsoring agencies, and aging infrastructures. The State Department seeks an FFRDC for R&D in three areas: Diplomatic Innovation and Modernization, Global CyberTech Solutions, and Global Operations and Acquisitions.
In 2008, a Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication report called for an R&D center such as RAND with multiple capabilities. They included facilitation of knowledge transfer across government through a help desk staffed by subject experts, assessments of cultural dynamics and societal values, audience segmentation analysis and behavioral trends, up-to-the-minute knowledge of media trends and communication technologies, a knowledge base for public diplomacy implementation and evaluation, a locus for project experimentation, and sustained memory of core data, best practices, and research. The recommendation was dismissed by State at the time. It still has value and deserves a second look today.
An archive ofDiplomacy’s Public Dimension: Books, Articles, Websites (2002-present) is maintained at George Washington University’s Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication. Current issues are also posted by the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, the Public Diplomacy Council of America, and Len Baldyga’s email listserv.
